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Can You Bank On It? Italy's Response to the 
Second Banking Directive of the 
European Community 
On December 15, 1989, the European Council1 adopted the 
Second Council Directive (Second Directive): describing it as 
1. The European Council is composed of the heads of state of the member 
countries comprising the European Community. 
2. Council Directive 891646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. The two principal methods 
for implementing European Community legislation are the regulation and the 
directive. Although the regulation is the stronger of the methods, the directive is 
required by law in specific areas, and may be the most effective tool in those 
areas. David Anderson, Inadequate Implementation of EEC Directives: A Roadblock 
on the Way to 19922, 11 B.C. INl"I, & COMP. L. REV. 91 (1988). Mr. Anderson 
provides a clear explanation of what directives are and how they function. 
The First Banking Directive was adopted in 1977. It identifies five basic 
categories that the European Council has targeted for harmonization: 
(1) rules abolishing barriers along Member State borders with respect to 
the provision of banking services, (2) rules providing for the freedom of 
[European Community (EC)] credit institutions to establish branches in 
other Member States, (3) uniform rules concerning essential authorization 
requirements for credit institutions, (4) uniform rules concerning essential 
supervisory standards, and (5) rules providing for (uniform) treatment of 
non-[EC] credit institutions. 
Michael Gruson & Werner Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the European 
Economic Community and Its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM INPL 
L.J. 205, 207-08 (1989); see also, First Council Directive 771'780 of 12 December 
1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions Re- 
lating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 20 O.J. 
(L 322) 1 [hereinafter First Directive]. 
The First Directive does not provide the complete procedures for realizing these 
targets, but it does lay the groundwork for the internal integration of EC banking 
laws. Although the First Directive provides for registration of Community banking 
institutions in the home country, it leaves some areas unchecked. For example, 
under the First Directive a Member State could still require registration of a for- 
eign banking institution within its territory as a prerequisite to doing business if it 
required the same thing of its own institutions. Moreover, the First Directive does 
not address the establishment of non-EC banks within the EC. 
Together with other EC banking regulations already in place, the Second Di- 
rective is intended to "[r]emove the remaining barriers to freedom of establishment 
of branches; and . . . grant full freedom to provide financial services throughout 
the EEC." Gruson & Nikowitz, supra, at 210; see also Second Council Directive 
891646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Admin- 
istrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of 
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive, 32 O.J. (L 386) 1, 1 (first Whereas 
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"the essential instrument for the achievement of the internal 
market."3 This landmark legislation changes the fundamental 
nature of banking in the European Community in two signifi- 
cant ways. First, the directive allows Community citizens to 
bank with any financial institution in any country. As a result, 
Italian savings will be able to flow in and out of the country 
with relative ease. For the purposes of this comment, this flow 
of capital will be referred to as the liberalization of capital. 
Second, banking licenses, which are issued and regulated by 
the home country of the enterprise in accord with the provi- 
sions of the directive, will permit a financial institution to do 
business anywhere within the Community without the autho- 
rization of the host country.' These basic changes or "twin 
shocks" will have a significant impact on I t a l ~ . ~  
Part I1 of this comment discusses the impact of liberaliza- 
tion of capital and banking deregulation under the Second 
Directive on the Italian government and the Italian banking 
industry. Part I11 discusses Italy's initial response t o  the Sec- 
ond Directive. Part IV discusses what further steps Italy must 
take to confront the Second Directive and its effects. 
clause) [hereinafter Second Directive]. The Second Directive fulfills this mandate by 
removing the three major obstacles left by the First Directive. It (1) permits an 
EC credit institution to set up a branch in another Member State with the autho- 
rization of its home country only; (2) provides for regulation and restriction at the 
Community level, thus liberating non-EC institutions from the intricate web of 
banking regulations and restrictions in each Member State; and (3) removes the 
"endowment capital" requirements. 
The First and Second Banking Directives were issued in pursuance of the goals 
outlined in the White Paper issued by the Commission of the European Communi- 
ties which contains over 300 proposals for integration of the entire Community 
market by December 31, 1992. The m i t e  Paper was to realize the four freedoms 
of the Treaty of Rome: (1) free movement of goods (Articles 48-58); (2) free move- 
ment of persons (Articles 48-58); (3) freedom to provide services (Articles 59-66); 
and (4) free circulation of capital (Articles 67-73). Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1958). An 
English translation is located at  1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 151. The parame- 
ters of this comment are delineated by the two latter freedoms. 
3. Second Directive, supra note 2, at  1. The goal of a unitary European mar- 
ket includes a unitary monetary system. The existence of a unitary monetary 
system may be far in the future but it is inevitable. Clyde Mitchell, Unified Bank- 
ing in Europe by 1993, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 28, 1988, at  3. 
4. Second Directive, supra note 2, at  1. 
5. Banking, Italian Style, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1989, at 26. 
6. Although this article focuses on Italy, the Second Directive will also have a 
substantial impact on other European countries, such as Spain and Greece. 
ITALY'S RESPONSE 
11. IMPACT OF THE SECOND IRECTIVE ON 
ITALY 
Italy is ill-prepared for both the liberalization of capital 
movement and banking deregulation-two elements critical to 
the Second Directive's goal of European financial integration.' 
A. Capital Liberalization and the 
Italian Government 
The imminent liberalization of capital within the Commu- 
nity presents significant problems for Italy. Italy's domestic 
savings provide a safe harbor for its government's fiscal poli- 
cies. Because of extensive governmental control and regulation, 
the government has faced virtually no competition for Italian 
savings. "[This] lack of competition. . . made it easier for the 
government to sell its bonds.'" In the wake of deregulation, the 
government fears that Italian savers will be lured to the more 
efficient and higher-yielding institutions of other Member 
States, whether they be located within Italy or in the other 
Member States. Thus, h d s  would be channeled from Italian 
government bonds into other areas and perhaps out of Italy 
altogether. 
Numerous commentators have observed that the biggest 
problem Italy faces in relation to harmonization of the Europe- 
an financial market is its deficit.' Italy's deficit approaches 
nearly two-thirds of the United States' deficit, yet the gross 
domestic product (GDP) is only one-seventeenth of the United 
States'.'' Italy's deficit is close to, if not over, its yearly 
GDP? The deficit problem has reached such proportions that 
7. See Big Whimper?, ECONOMIST, February 27, 1988, at 14, 15 (Supp.) (Sur- 
vey: The Italian Economy); The Japan of Europe? Italy is Enjoying Spirited 
Growth, BARRON'S NAT'L BUS. & FIN. WKLY., May 2, 1988, a t  14 [hereinafter The 
Japan of Europe?]. 
8. Public hfligacy, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1988, a t  10, 13 (Supp.) (Survey: The 
Italian Economy). 
9. Lamberto Dini, The Italian Financial System in the Perspective of 1992, 167 
BANCA NAZIONALE Q. REV. 441 (1988); Noel Negretti, Italy: Economy is Sulging 
Ahead, Spurring Export Demand, BUS. AM., Apr. 10, 1989, at 10; Richard 
Waddington, Italy Cabinet Approves Plan to Slash State Deficit, THE REUTER LI- 
BRARY REPORT, Sept. 28, 1990, BC Cycle. 
10. Waddington, supra note 9; Public Profligacy, supra note 8, at 10; The 
Italian Economy; Living with Instability, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1988, at  5 (Supp.) 
(Survey: The Italian Economy) [hereinafter The Italian Economy]. 
11. Public Profligacy, supra note 8, at 10; The Italian Economy, supra note 10, 
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if something isn't done soon, the yearly interest payments on 
the deficit will exceed the amount the government can borrow. 
One naturally asks how a country so laden with debt can 
survive, much less rank as the fourth capitalistic economic 
power of the world. The answer is that although the Italian 
people seem to live faithfully by the maxim carpe diem," they 
are ironically the world's number one savers of disposable in- 
come. Italians save an incredible twenty-three percent of their 
disposable income compared to eighteen percent for the Japa- 
nese and only four percent for United States citizens.13 
The increased competition that the government will face in 
borrowing money will likely force it to go outside of Italy to  
finance its debt. Finding such fmancing could be difficult con- 
sidering current world and European financial conditions." 
The traditional softness of the lira and the current government 
debt structure justifiably worry foreign investors.15 
Considering the lack of funds the Italian government may 
soon face, some fear that Italy may resort to restrictive adjust- 
ment measures to delay the full effect of the transition.16 Be- 
cause Italy is "second only to [Greece] in ignoring EEC 
rules,"" there may be cause for concern in regard to the Sec- 
ond Directive. Particularly since it  expressly provides for limit- 
ed exercise of "safeguard clauses." Italy might use these clauses 
at 5; . Italy's GDP may actually be higher if the product of the black market were 
included in the calculation. Lies, Damned Lies and Italy's GDP, E c o ~ o ~ ~ s r ,  Feb. 
27, 1988, at 4 (Supp.) (Survey: The Italian Economy). 
12. Cogliere il g h  in Italian. "Seize the day" in English. As Italy's cuisine 
and many fashion designers indicate, Italians would seem to also live by an Italian 
proverb that states, "Better to live one day as a lion than a thousand as a sheep." 
13. Public Profligacy, supra note 8, at 10. The reason for these personal stock- 
piles is not entirely clear. As the six-digit numbers required for a week's supply of 
groceries indicate, the lira lost its value after World War II. There is no history of 
constancy in the lira which would explain the phenomenon. Perhaps it stems from 
the close familial ties of Italians and the desire of parents to provide security for 
their children and grandchildren. It may also be that Italians have a strong 
aversion to personal debt. Regardless of the reason, the fact is that Italians save a 
staggering amount of their personal income. There is some concern that the 
younger generation of Italians might not be as willing to stockpile as much of its 
disposable income as past generations, thus eroding one of the traditional bases of 
domestic financial strength. It is very likely that many young Italians will no 
longer be content with supplying the world with high fashion and other ?talian" 
commodities while foregoing consumption in order to finance the debt of a wasteful 
government. See id. 
14. Patrick Hosking, Banking on the Future, EUROPE, March 1990, at 6, 9. 
15. Italy's Debt Dilemnur, ECONOMIST, April 14, 1990, at 87. 
16. Dini, supm note 9, at 442. 
17. Europe, as the Romm Do It, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1988, at 68. 
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to circumvent Second Directive mandates. So far, however, 
Italy has not exercised these clauses and has substantially 
complied with the deadlines imposed by the directive;18 wheth- 
er it will continue to  do so remains to be seen as the effects of 
liberalization of capital and deregulation increase at the gov- 
ernmental and banking-sector levels. 
B. Banking Deregulation and Italy's 
Financial Institutions 
Banking Deregulation under the Second Directive will 
substantially impact Italian financial institutions in both the 
Italian and European markets. 
1. Italian market 
The high rate of savings in Italy will attract vigorous com- 
petition from both Community and non-Community financial 
institutions.19 As Italy lowers its protectionist barriers, mas- 
sive domestic savings will be fully accessible to those who are 
willing to pay higher interest rates to obtain Italian capital." 
Italy may not be ready for the leaner and more competitive 
foreign institutions that will certainly move in when Italy is no 
longer a provincial market? At present, Italy has a more high- 
ly regulated banking industry than any of its European coun- 
terparts? The legislation governing Italian banks dates back 
to the fascist system." This antiquated financial system holds 
18. There are likely many reasons for the compliance, but principal among 
these is that Italy needs European monetary unity, and more particularly, a 
European Central Bank. uAs a highly open economy that exports goods manufac- 
tured with imported inputs, [Italy] is especially vulnerable to external shocks in 
relative prices that are quickly translated into domestic price rises." Fabrizio 
Saccomami, Italy Needs European Union, J. COM., Mar. 9, 1990, at 8A. 
19. Negretti, supra note 9; Italy's Debt Dilemma, supra note 15, at  87. 
20. For example, the Japanese, who have the capacity to endure initial losses 
or low returns to gain major market shares, are moving quickly to set up branches 
in Rome and Milan. Gary Evans, The Great Stampede I& Italy, EUROMONEY, Dec. 
1988, at 43. 
21. James R. Kraus, Deregulation Seen as  Blow to Italian Banks, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 9, 1990, at 14. 
22. Gary Humphreys, Italy's Banks Face the Battle, EUROMONEX, Sept. 1988, at  
76 (Special supp.); Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 13. 
23. On to 1992, ECONOMIS~, May 26, 1990, at  19, 20; see also, SALVATORE MAsrRO- 
PASQUA, THE BANKING SYSTEM IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EEC: INSTITUTIONAL AND 
STRUCTURAL ASPECTS (1978); Linda Stringfellow, Sheltered Ezistence, BANKER, Sept. 
1989, at  74. 
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back Italy's thriving and modern industry.* 
Italian banking regulations are a quagmire of complex 
restrictions and rules? The product, and perhaps the aim, of 
such burdensome regulation is twofold: (1) to keep huge capital 
stores in Italy where the government can use them to finance 
its deficit; and (2) to protect a weak Italian banking industry. 
One reason that regulation is so extensive is that Italian 
banks are mostly owned by the Italian Govern- 
ment ownership is a fundamental part of the oligarchical na- 
ture of government and business in Ital~.~' Banking positions 
are awarded on the basis of political cronyism, known as 
lottizzazi~ne;~~ the top posts are awarded to members of the 
ruling political party who in turn staff their respective institu- 
tions with colleagues and friends.29 
An additional complication affecting Italy's ability to com- 
ply with the Second Directive is that southern Italy is consider- 
ably less wealthy than northern Italy.3o The rich North may 
be ready to at  least evaluate and confront the challenges of the 
Second Directive whereas the poor South may not. The South 
may impede progress toward realization of the banking goals 
which northern industry is eager to realize. Given that the gap 
between the two is ever-widening, the South's main concern 
seems to be simply keeping pace with the N~r th .~ '  Implement- 
ing Second Directive mandates in the South may be practically 
24. The Italian Economy, supra note 10, at 3. 
25. MASTROPASQUA, supra note 23, at  115; see also Humphreys, supra note 22, 
a t  78. 
26. The state not only oversees the system but almost completely administers i t  
through the Bank of Italy. Statistics indicate that "80% of the banking system is 
state-controlled." Big Whimper?, supra note 7, a t  14. The remaining 20% is proba- 
bly so heavily influenced by the other 8Wo that the Italian government has practi- 
cal control over that also. See On to 1992, supra note 23, at 20. 
27. The control of most industry is in the hands of a few families, the Agnellis 
of Fiat being the most powerful. Europe's Japanese, THE ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990, 
a t  26. 
28. Lottizzazione has been described as "the habit of filling top banking posts 
with political acolytes." It&li.un Banking: Political Princes, ECONOMIST, June 2, 
1990, a t  82. 
29. This is a problem that plagues Italy not only in the banking sector but in 
almost all areas of government and industry. 
30. Mad Dogs and Mafiosi, ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990, at  21. The NortWSouth 
situation presents numerous problems to Italy, fraudulent banking practices being 
only one. As Italy prepares for complete European integration in 1992, it must 
realize that the Community will likely not tolerate Italy's apparent inability to 
eradicate these practices. 
31. Id. at 21. 
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impossible. 
Italy now fears deregulation will make the financial prod- 
ucts of foreign institutions much more appealing than its own. 
Until now, Italy's investors and savers haven't had many choic- 
es in financial services. Before the First and, more sigdicant- 
ly, the Second Banking Directives, "Italian savers were forced 
to buy the only dish on the menu"t2 when they have more 
choices, they will most likely choose more lucrative opportuni- 
ties. 
Foreign institutions in Italy that attract depositors may 
divert or  transfer those funds to their own or other European 
countries to finance more profitable ventures than the 1tdian 
budget deficit. Moreover, Italian investors may seek out invest- 
ment and saving opportunities in other Member States thereby 
removing the funds directly from the reach of their own govern- 
ment. 
Many analysts believe that when controls are lifted and 
Italian savers become more familiar with the financial services 
that institutions in other Member States offer, they will leave 
the governmeneand the banks-without a source of fiu~ds.~~ 
Some say they have already begun to do so. "In 1988, out of a 
total of 180,000 billion lire ($138 billion) of new savings, 2% 
was invested in foreign sec~rities."~ 
Italy stands t o  fare poorly against foreign competition. 
Heavy regulation has created an inefficient banking industry. 
The service that Italian banks offer to their customers is "gros- 
sly ineffi~ient."~' For example, waiting in line an hour or two 
for a simple transaction is routine? Banks are weighted 
down by excessive and ineffective personnel?' Italian banks 
have fewer branch offices than the banks of any other Europe- 
32. Humphreys, supra note 22, at 78. 
33. Italy's Debt Dilemma, supra note 15, at 87. One observer predicts that 
"Italian investors will become more sophisticated in investing overseas and will buy 
Japanese bonds and equities." Evans, supra note 20, at 43; see also Family Credit, 
BANKER, Oct. 1989, at 25, 25-26. 
34. Italy's Debt Dilemma, supra note 15, at 87. 
35. Banking, Italian Style, supra note 5, at 26. 
36. Italy: The Odd Country, ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990, at  3. The author con- 
firms these accounts by way of personal experience, having had, on one occasion, 
to wait two hours, in three different lines, to cash a traveler's check. 
37. Paolo Forcellini, Affari sen= confini, L'ESPRESSO, Jan. 8, 1990, at 146. Italy 
averages 22.7 employees per branch office, by far the highest out of its European 
neighbors, Japan or the United States. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at  14. 
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an country.38 The processing of checks and drafts takes mark- 
edly longer than anywhere else in the Comm~nity?~ Most 
Italians do not even accept checks.40 These difficulties dramat- 
ically increase the challenge Italy's financial institutions face 
as they try not only to maintain domestic market share-until 
now Italy's financial institutions have held virtually one hun- 
dred percent of the market-but also to attract foreign inves- 
tors and saverdl 
2. European market 
Many of the same obstacles that keep Italy's financial 
institutions from being profitable domestically may also keep 
them from competing with other Member States' institutions in 
their respective countries. This means that Italy would certain- 
ly lose a significant opportunity. Furthermore, the very exis- 
tence of Italy's financial institutions may be at stake. Given the 
economies of scale in an integrated market, European banks of 
the h ture  may need to establish branches throughout Europe 
to  survive. 
The Italian system has favored small banks that cater to 
the needs of the small investor. Consequently, several of Italy's 
banks are ~ndercapitalized:~ Because of this, these banks will 
not be able to  meet the requirements the Second Directive 
imposes as a condition to expanding banking operations in 
other countries.43 
To compete abroad, many Italian financial institutions 
might consider merging with other financial institutions. How- 
ever, mergers are costly and burdened by the intricacies of 
regional politics and cultural differences." Some comrnenta- 
38. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 14. 
39. Id. "A Bank of Italy study showed that the average [check] takes 29 days 
to clear compared to three to 10 days in other countries." Humphreys, supra note 
22, at 76. 
40. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at  14. 
41. Giuliano Amato, Italian Minister of the Treasury, stated that when an Ital- 
ian realizes that he can accomplish in one day at a foreign bank what it takes a 
week to accomplish at an Italian bank, he will be induced to patronize the foreign 
bank. Salvatore Gatti, Deciderd il rigore, L'ESPRESSO, Jan. 8, 1989, at  140, 141. 
42. David Lane, Discipline Time, BANKER, Od. 1989, at 64, 65; Playing by the 
Same Rules, BANKER, Aug. '1987, at  39. 
43. Banking, Italian Styk, supra note 5, at 27. 
44. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 15. The importance of cultural clashes in 
banking administration and organization should not be overlooked. Hosking, supra 
note 14, at 9. 
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tors argue that even with the tightening of alliances, actual 
mergers will be rare?' Such mergers are costly because most 
of the smaller banks are profitable given the Italian propensity 
to save." Italy faces a perplexing situation: mergers are neces- 
sary now to deal with the new European market that could 
lure away domestic savers while savers are keeping their mon- 
ey at home, making such mergers very expensive. 
As previously mentioned, costs of banking are high in Italy 
compared to other Member States? Citizens of other Member 
States who are accustomed to more efficient domestic financial 
institutions will not buy Italian financial services abroad un- 
less they are competitively priced. 
111. ITALY'S POSSIBLE RBSPONSE TO THE 
SECOND IRECTIVE 
In evaluating how Italy will respond to the mandates of 
the Second Directive, it is useful to fmt review Italy's past 
response to problems posed by European integration. 
A. Traditional Response to Problems 
As each new phase of European integration has ap- 
proached, many have doubted whether Italy would be willing or 
able to meet the deadline. Just when such compliance seemed 
all but impossible, Italy somehow managed t o  overcome its 
impediments and perform." As one commentator noted: 
Every time Italy has been faced with meeting the demands 
put on it by its fellow-Europeans, at  the birth of the European 
Economic Community in 1957 or at  the start of the European 
Monetary system in 1979, doom-laden voices have predicted 
the worst; Italy, they have declared, would not be up to it. 
Each time they have been wrong. Italy has not only been up 
to it, it has excelled. So when Italians voted in a referendum 
last June on European integration, they endorsed it on a 
grand scale." 
Thus, Italy has frequently proved its ability to overcome 
45. Forcellini, supra note 37, at 148. 
46. Lane, supra note 42, at 64; Big Whimper?, supm note 7, at 15. 
47. Forcellini, supra note 37, at 148. 
48. Perhaps this ingenuity helped transform the nation from its post World 
War 11 ruin into the industrial giant that it is today. 
49. On to 1992, supra note 23, at 19. 
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what have seemed insurmountable obstacles. The obstacles 
that the Second Directive has created in the kanc ia l  sector 
seem to be particularly insurmountable. Italy may, however, be 
up to the challenge. 
Italy is a prosperous nation. This prosperity is founded 
upon Italy's recovery from the recession of the 1970s and its 
tremendous economic growth in  the 1960s .~~  Italy's industry 
demonstrates high growth rates in productivity and an ability 
to cut coststl this industry is modern and recently retooled. 
In  the past decade, Italy had the fastest growth rate of all 
European economies.52 Its GDP ranks fourth among the wor- 
ld's top capitalistic economic powers, ahead of both Great Brit- 
ain and France.53 Some suggest that if Italy's black market 
were taken into account, its GDP would rank third among the 
world's top economies." 
One commentator has suggested that Italy is economically 
stable and that now the major questions are political. 
If [these political que stionsl are resolved satisfactorily, Italy 
will not only prosper and flourish economically, it will become 
a thoroughly modem state in every sense. If they are not, 
Italy will continue to achieve much less than its economic 
potential, and at the same time continue in political terms to 
be an odd-man-out in Europe." 
B. Response to the Second Directive 
Although much remains to do in regard to the Second Di- 
rective, Italy has begun to make significant progress. 
1 .  Capital liberalization 
Although there may be problems in financing the deficit, 
the Government bond market in Italy is the third largest in the 
world. Perhaps this fact, along with the likely future depen- 
dence on bond financing for years to come, will make the mar- 
50. Europe's Japanese, supra note 27, at 26; Italy: The Odd Country, supra 
note 36, at 3; me Japan of Europe?, supm note 7 ,  at 14. 
51. Europe's Japanese, supra note 27, at 29; T;he Japan of Europe? supra note 
7 ,  at 14. 
52. The Italian Economy, supra note 10, at 3. 
53. Lies, Damned Lies and Italy's GDP, supra note 11, at 4 .  
54. Id. It is reported that Italy's black market ranges from 20% to 30% of its 
GDP. Id. 
55. Italy: The Odd Country, supm note 36, at 3. 
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ket attractive to foreign investors and make Italy's search for 
future financing less intense. 
2. Banking deregulation 
In 1989 major legislation was proposed to help streamline 
the banking sector? This has given banks and companies 
"more scope in foreign currency dealings."57 Italian savings 
banks are becoming stronger by increasing their capital ra- 
t i o ~ . ~ ~  
Privatization is one of the key features that Italy has un- 
dertaken to improve its banking sector and meet the mandates 
of the Second Directive. Privatization has made one bank, 
Mediobanca, very profitable." It  was previously owned by 
three banks that were owned by the Italian government.BO Wre- 
sting Mediobanca control from lottizzazione and political wran- 
gling was difficult, but it was done? 
The progress of Italy's financial institutions is also evidenc- 
ed by the provision of more efficient means of conducting trans- 
actions. Italy is participating in linking systems that allow 
customers to gain access to their accounts in all of Europe 
through automatic teller machines.62 
Although Italy faces many negative effects of regulation 
under the Second Directive, "the parochiality of Italian banking 
has protected it from over-exposure to U.S. real estate or Third 
World debt."63 In fact, Italy has virtually no third-world expo- 
sure. 
There may be a 'lag time" within which Italy's banking 
industry can make the necessary reforms under the Second 
Directive. Some even argue that Italians haven't sought invest- 
56. Major New Legislation to Help Streamline the Banking Sector, BARRON'S 
NAT'L BUS. & FIN. WKLY., Dec. 11, 1989, a t  47. 
57. More Haste, EcoNOMI~, Nov. 26, 1988, at 54. 
58. Lane, supra note 42, at 64. 
59. Decision Impossible, ECONOMI~, May 26, 1990, at 13. 
60. IRI, Industria per la ricostruzione italiana (Industry for Italian Reconstruc- 
tion), the holding company of the Italian government, was originally formed to aid 
economic restructuring after World War 11. As is true for many governments, this 
agency grew beyond its original scope and became a method of strict government 
control over services and industry. 
61. Ystituto San Paolo di Torinon and "Banca Commerciale Italianan are also 
highly efficient. On to 1992, supm note 23, at 20. 
62. Cash Dispenser Network Expands, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 1990, at 
39. 
63. Banking, Italian Style, supra note 5, at 26. 
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ment opportunities abroad, nor will they do 
IV. FURTHER STEPS ITALY MUST TAKE 
Although Italy has several points of strength and has made 
s i w c a n t  progress, there are further steps that  it must take 
to prepare for an integrated European financial market. 
A. Liberalization of Capital Movement 
In order to meet the challenge of the liberalization of capi- 
tal movement, Italy must reduce its deficit. What Italy now 
faces makes the United States' Gramm-Rudrnan goals look 
simple. Yet, according to one commentator, Italy has something 
more effective than Gramm-Rudman-it has the European 
Cornm~ni ty .~~  Unity is imminent, and even if parity with the 
other Member States is not possible, Italy must begin to reform 
its fiscal policies. Italy must take two significant steps to im- 
plement the needed reform: it must (1) raise more revenue by 
increasing taxes or by improving its collection procedures; and 
(2) reduce government spending? 
Italy's tax revenue could best be increased by improving 
collection, rather than by raising taxes. Better collection proce- 
dures could solve many of Italy's fiscal problems. Tax evasion is 
a way of life in Italy. One commentator asserts tax revenues 
are collected with a ~olander.~' Some estimate that forty-five 
64. See Maurizio Maggi & Maurizio Valentini, Conti Aperti, L'ESPRESSO, May 
13, 1990, at 140, 145. Maggi and Valentini interviewed Alvise Cicogna, director of 
Chase Gestioni (controlled by Chase Manhattan Bank), who opined that the Italian 
saver will not go abroad because of the good returns on government bonds, the 
saver's increased ability to physically control his capital when it is in Italy, and 
the increased Liquidity of domestic savings and investment. Id. Maggi and Valentini 
also interviewed Milvia Groff, director of Banca Euromobiliare and the officer in 
charge of the external markets of the merchant bank Euromobiliare, who said that 
she has only had one client come to her interested in investing abroad, and that if 
a client came to her with a hundred million lire, she would sincerely counsel him 
to  invest in Italy. Id. Mr. Cicogna's and Ms. Groffs observations may be correct in 
the short run. However, given the extensive liberty and access to capital that the 
Second Directive prescribes, it is likely that Italians will eventually learn to invest 
their money abroad and do so with minimal difEculty as to control, liquidity, and 
higher rates of return. Fortunately for Italy, there will likely be a period before 
this happens within which it can streamline its banking sector and prepare itself 
to compete both domestically and in foreign markets. 
65. Onto 1992, supra note23, at 19. 
66. Last of the Big Spenders, ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990, at 11. 
67. Id. 
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percent of Italy's total value-added tax goes un~ollected.~~ High- 
er taxes would not increase revenue rather tax evasion, further 
eroding what little faith is left in the system. In addition, tax 
increases are highly unlikely because they would produce seri- 
ous political repercussions. The solution is to  enforce the tax 
codes as they presently exist not raise taxes. 
Reduced government spending is also essential to reducing 
Italy's deficit. Political patronage has contributed to  exaggerat- 
ed governmental  pend ding.^' Typical examples are health care 
and disability pensions." In Italy local governments provide 
health services, but they usually can't pay for them; the bill is 
simply sent on to Rome for payment, thus contributing to  the 
increased deficit.71 Furthermore, there are a large number of 
disability pensions in Italy. In fact, more disability pensions 
are given than old-age pensions. These pensions are given not 
because work in Italy is particularly dangerous, but rather to 
secure votes or political favors from able-bodied  worker^.'^ 
In sum, Italy must drastically cut government spending. 
There are some encouraging signs. The Italian cabinet recently 
approved a measure that calls for sweeping spending cuts and 
increased  revenue^.'^ 
B. Banking Deregulation 
The task of banking deregulation presents many challenges 
for Italy because Italy's entrepreneurial spirit and high rate of 
domestic savings, coupled with an elitist domination of indus- 
try, have traditionally favored small enterprises, especially in 
the financial sector.74 
Most Italian banks are still geared to  the traditional idea 
of selling their services primarily to  current account custom- 
e r ~ . ? ~  "[Tlhe emphasis of a bank's business must shift from 
money transmission (making payments) to selling products. 
Banks are in the business of selling financial services rather 
68. Id. 
69. The problem can be traced to the generous social legislation of the 1970s. 
Id. at 12. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Waddington, supm note 9. 
74. Rags to Riches, Low-tech Niches, ECONOMI~,  Feb. 27, 1988, at 21 (Supp.) 
(Survey: The Italian Economy). 
75. Metamorphosis, Enter the Outsiders, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 1989, at 24. 
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than banking. Once they f d y  appreciate this fact, banks will 
have to imitate non-banks' sales methods."76 One example is 
the credit card market; Italy's financial institutions have si&- 
icant room for expansion in this area.77 The market is ripe: 
Europeans, particularly Italians, still use cash to transact most 
business.78 Italian bankers must search out and pursue these 
types of opportunities to gain a foothold in European banking. 
Italy's banks must also be freed from heavy governmental 
regulation. The answers to the challenges that deregulation 
poses do not lie in new political parties or  ideas; as one observ- 
er candidly points out, Italy suffers from too much democra- 
~ y . ' ~  Voting patterns shift nominally from year to yearego The 
real answer to Italy's political problems and heavy regulation 
lies in reform of the existing parties and the policies that an 
overly pluralistic system has fostered. Those currently in power 
must demonstrate the discipline and self-will necessary to alter 
the current state of the deficit, heavy governmental control, 
and political patronization that have characterized Italian 
politics from the immediate post-war period to the present. 
As inefficient practices are abandoned and regulation liber- 
alized, Italian financial institutions will probably begin to in- 
vest in other related areas such as insurance or investment 
services. "In preparation for the single market, each bank must 
look at its customer base and its operating position within the 
market to ascertain its business goals and formulate its strate- 
gies and plans."' This advice is particularly important for 
Italian financial institutions because they have long had the 
luxury of a state-controlled monopoly on financial services; they 
must become more responsive to customer needs if they are to 
keep speed, or actually even compete, with leaner and more ag- 
gressive European financial institutions. 
Accordingly, Italy must privatize its banking industry. This 
could provide the rapid solution that Italy needs. The Italian 
government owns an extensive amount of most major indus- 
tries and at least fay-one percent of nearly all banks.82 The 
76. Id. 
77. Europeans average just over one credit card per person while United States 
citizens average four. Hosking, supm note 14, at 9. 
78. Id. 
79. The Case for Reform, Eco~omsr,  May 26, 1990, at 29. 
80. Birth of the Thing, ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990, at 5. 
81. Philip Young, Europe 1992, MAG. BANR MGMT., Apr. 1990, at 52. 
82. Privatisation in Fits and Starts, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1988, at 28. 
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government has signaled that it will get out of all industries 
where its involvement is unnecessary." 
Results from the limited amount of privatization that has 
already occurred in other sectors are encouraging. Productivity 
has increased and jobs are now given on the basis of skill and 
ability rather than as political fayom or by lottizzazione. 
Furthermore, mergers and networking among Italian and 
other European Community banks may better enable those 
banks to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the Sec- 
ond Directive; additionally, mergers and networking must be 
considered as part of the solution to many of Italy's current 
banking  problem^.'^ Some predict a "merger surge."85 Italian 
banks must become bigger quickly in order to meet the capi- 
talization requirements and the organizational demands of 
doing business on a European scale. A general manager of a 
large Italian bank opines that aanks  with ratio and capital 
deficiency problems should be absorbed by stronger banks."86 
The Bank of Italy is encouraging such mergers?' 
Perhaps networking among Italian and European Com- 
munity banks is a viable alternative to actual mergers, given 
the immense capital and organization required to accomplish a 
merger. Unity is forthcoming but nationalistic ideals run deep 
throughout the European Community; perhaps loosely formed 
alliances or "constellations" will provide for a smoother and 
faster transition process.88 
Italy has not acted, nor typically does it  act, until a crisis 
forces it t d 9  Some say that Italy can't afford to wait that long 
this time.g0 
Italians have long proved their ingenuity in the face of 
apparently insurmountable obstacles; just think what they 
might achieve if they could exercise their talents free of red 
tape, in a stable financial and political climate, and with a 
83. Id. at 31. 
84. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 15. see also Hosking, supra note 14, at 9. 
85. Young, supra note 81, at 52. 
86. Lane, supra note 42, at 67. 
87. Id. at 64; Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 15. 
88. Hosking, supra note 14, at 9. 
89. Rome Fiddles While The Economy Burns, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1988, at 32 
(Supp.) (Survey: The Italian Economy). 
90. Id. 
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public sector which was just half as efficient as private indus- 
try. Italy could well become Europe's leading ec~nomy.~' 
Italy must make progress quickly and it has the ability to 
do so. Since the end of World War I1 the Italians have demon- 
strated, individually and as a nation, the ability to marshal 
resources and capital t o  create jobs and prosperity. The bank- 
ing sector must do the same within the limits that the current 
situation has imposed on it to assure its very survival. 
The Italian government has recognized the deficit problem 
and has taken sigruficant preliminary steps toward resolving it. 
The government must continue the trends it has established by 
curbing its appetite for domestic savings, thus permitting in- 
dustry and financial services entrepreneurs to offer higher 
investment returns. 
Privatization has been slow in coming but a good trend has 
been established. Given the impetus for efficiency created by 
European unity, the Italian government must eventually divest 
itself of non-essential enterprises. This will, among other bene- 
fits, alleviate some of the si@icant inefficiencies in the bank- 
ing sector. 
Italians may begin to invest some of their money abroad, 
but this will likely be delayed until the average Italian investor 
becomes more familiar with the financial services offered by 
foreign banks. In the meantime, Italy's financial institutions 
can reorganize and make the changes necessary to remain at- 
tractive to the Italian investor. 
An immediate gain of market share for Italy in other Euro- 
pean countries is unlikely. However, if Italian financial institu- 
tions succeed in maintaining a significant portion of their do- 
mestic market, they can use their solid base of domestic sav- 
ings to reinforce their infrastructures for eventual expansion. 
Even though compliance with the Second Directive is an 
arduous task, Italy seems to be implementing the legislation 
according t o  the timetable established in the Second Directive. 
Italy must not only comply with the requirements of the Sec- 
ond Directive, but it must also amplify the measures it has 
undertaken t o  reduce the deficit and make its banking industry 
more efficient and competitive. There is no viable alternative. 
The very survival of the Italian banking industry is a t  stake. 
In sum, the problems in this area are greater for Italy than 
91. The Italian Economy, supra note 10, at 4. 
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most of the other Member States of the European Communi- 
ty.g2 However, Italy has initiated reforms, and present trends 
suggest that these reforms are gaining momentum. The aggre- 
gate effect of the reforms, and the gradual augmentation of 
Italian savers' knowledge of what foreign institutions and mar- 
kets offer, could give Italian banks an opportunity to 
strengthen themselves and prepare for the challenges of doing 
business in a single European market. Italy could accelerate its 
process of reform and demonstrate its traditional ability to turn 
a crisis into huge success. Can we bank on Italy's response to 
the Second Banking Directive of the European Community? 
Only Italy can answer that question. 
Jeffrey A. Orr 
92. One somewhat fatalistic commentator suggests that Italy's problems are so 
grave that it has no hope of playing a major part in a United Europe. Giuseppe 
Turani, Ma la sfida t gid persa, L'ESPRESSO, Jan. 8, 1989, at 139. 
